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Introduction
Water systems throughout the United States are broken, both literally
and figuratively. The purpose of water utilities is to provide access to clean
and convenient water, which promotes human health and productivity.
Yet, a growing number of utilities charge unconscionable prices for water1
and otherwise carry out policies that decrease, rather than increase, water
access.2 The obvious scapegoat for unconscionably high water prices is the
desperate need for infrastructure funding.3 But this alone does not explain
why many governments choose to impose harsh penalties on constituents
who cannot pay instead of seeking other solutions. The situation indicates
a larger, underlying problem of governmental disregard of the
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1

See, e.g., ROGER D. COLTON, FISHER, SHEEHAN & COLTON, THE AFFORDABILITY OF WATER AND
WASTEWATER SERVICE IN TWELVE U.S. CITIES: A SOCIAL, BUSINESS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 1, 8
(2020) (concluding that in twelve US cities, “water bills are nearly universally unaffordable for the
lowest income households, and have been so for a number of years” and that “issues of unaffordability
are increasingly reaching into households with more moderate incomes”), reprinted in Guardian
Investigation into US Water Poverty: Read the Full Analysis, THE GUARDIAN (June 23, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/VWJ4-VHND; Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Constitutive Commitment to Water, 36 B.C.
J.L. & SOC. JUST. 159, 165 (2016) (“According to a study of 100 municipalities conducted by USA Today
in 2012, monthly water rates had at least doubled in the prior twelve years in nearly thirty percent of
surveyed cities. Rates are particularly high in communities with a large proportion of racial
minorities.” (footnotes omitted)).
2 See, e.g., COLTON, supra note 1 (“The unaffordability of water has led in some place to a
dramatic increase in the number of households having service disconnected for nonpayment.”).
3 See generally VALUE OF WATER CAMPAIGN & AM. SOC. OF CIV. ENG’RS, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS
OF INVESTING IN WATER INFRASTRUCTURE: HOW A FAILURE TO ACT WOULD AFFECT THE US ECONOMIC
RECOVERY (2020), https://perma.cc/QH6H-YN9Y.
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fundamental human needs of constituents, especially the most
economically and socially vulnerable among them.
One path to more just water policy might be through legal structures
that demand greater responsiveness by local agencies to the needs of their
constituents. A potential framework for achieving this goal is provided by
participatory governance theory, which aims to enable those who are most
closely affected by a problem to influence how policymakers solve that
problem.4 Participatory governance systems, however, are frequently
ineffective in that they solicit input from constituents, yet ultimately
disregard that input, resulting in merely performative or cosmetic
participation.5 Such cosmetic processes are most likely to exclude the
perspectives of people who are traditionally marginalized from power and
underrepresented in decision-making systems, thereby subverting a
primary purpose of the process.6 Thus, for participatory governance to
succeed in making government more responsive to its least powerful
constituents, a substantially reimagined model is needed. The new model
must address the common critique that participatory systems too often
fail because they do not correct for existing power imbalances among their
participants.7
This Article offers a revamped model of participatory governance—
the Constituent Empowerment Model (“CE Model”)—which affirmatively
shifts power to the voices of marginalized constituents.8 The CE Model
focuses on three concepts necessary to produce this shift in power:
operationalized (feasibly realized) participation; constituent primacy; and
structural accountability.9 To illustrate how these three components of a
CE system might be constructed, this Article examines a model recently
adopted in the City of Baltimore that is designed to shift the balance of
power between the water utility and its customers.10 The Baltimore
example offers a potential blueprint for how this new form of

4 See, e.g., Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance Work for
the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 413–17 (2013); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, at 355–56 (2004)
(describing the motivations of a participation-based governance model); Tara J. Melish, Maximum
Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the
Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 58 (2010) (promoting that “the needs, experiences,
and priorities of those most affected by social welfare policy [be] taken directly into account as a
mandatory part of policy formulation and assessment”).
5 See infra Section II.A.
6

See infra Part I.

7

See infra Part I.

8

See infra Part II.

9

See infra Sections 11.C, 11.D, 11.E.

10

See infra Sections I.B, I.C, I.D.
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participatory governance might be used to make other local institutions
more responsible to the needs of disempowered constituents, even when
those institutions have long resisted such reform.11
Part I of this Article briefly explains the core tenets of participatory
governance and its vulnerability to cosmetic outcomes and illustrates
both ideas using the Baltimore case study. Part II begins by discussing the
need for a strong executor to impose a participatory structure on an
unwilling institution. It then explains each of the three elements of the
CE Model, as illustrated through the case study, and how each element
shifts power to marginalized constituents for the purpose of countering
specific vulnerabilities, which make traditional participatory systems
susceptible to cosmeticism.12 For example, to counter the disregard of
marginalized voices, the CE Model mandates that these voices be given
significant weight and safeguards their expression from institutional
interference.13 Participatory systems are also easily abused when
participation levels are low; in response, the CE Model emphasizes the
creative design of low-cost, low-barrier methods of participation, such as
constituent proxies and the “double-duty” use of dispute resolution
procedures.14 A third common problem is a lack of accountability when
outcomes are cosmetic. In response, the CE Model creates triggerable
consequences when the participatory system fails to create meaningful
change.15 A redesigned participatory governance model that addresses
these common failings should promote more meaningful incorporation
of marginalized voices into policy making.
Having analyzed the components of the CE Model in detail, Part II
concludes by briefly situating the CE Model within the larger scholarly
landscape of ideas about how the public might effectively claim power and
demand greater governmental responsiveness to public needs. It explains
how the CE Model departs from traditional participatory governance
models in some significant ways, while embracing other methods through
which the public can generate and claim power. This Article closes with
thoughts on the potential applicability of the CE Model to other contexts.
11 The need to improve the effectiveness of participatory schemes for marginalized constituents
is especially important given that participation is already an influential force at the local agency level.
See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 572 (2017) (“Local agencies
also often operate at the edge of a blurry line between governmental action and public participation.
Community engagement in zoning regulation, school board decisions, police review commissions,
and other examples of the blending of public and private underscore the breadth of citizen
participation in local agency work that is uncommon at the federal level.”).
12 See infra Sections 11.C, 11.D, 11.E.
13

See infra Section II.D.

14

See infra Section II.C.

15

See infra Sections I.D, II.E.
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Participatory Governance: Foundations and Vulnerabilities

A. A Brief Introduction to the Foundations of Participatory Governance
and its Vulnerabilities
No effective framework currently exists for direct, sustained, and
meaningful engagement between a government and its constituents.
Political and legal structures generally afford very limited formal influence
to direct expressions of public opinion, and this is especially true with
respect to the perspectives of people who are marginalized from power. A
rich body of thought on how to change this is offered by those who study
and critique participatory governance theory.16 Participatory governance
theory has many strands,17 but as generally used in this Article,
participatory governance encourages problem solving that is
meaningfully influenced by broad constituent input during each stage of
the process, including problem identification, solution development and
implementation, and long-term monitoring, refinement, and
accountability.18
16 A prominent concept in domestic legal literature is “New Governance,” as defined in Orly
Lobel’s seminal 2004 work, which identified eight unifying characteristics among twenty-three
schools of thought about participatory governance. See Lobel, supra note 4, at 384. Also crucially
relevant are participatory systems that traditionally apply to matters of zoning and urban
redevelopment. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: LocalResident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 55 (2006) (stating that in
matters of urban development, participatory structures are inaccessible to poor residents); see also
Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 216, 217 (1969); Patience
A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary Rights in Urban Redevelopment
Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 296 (2010); Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads
to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 861, 865 (2000).
17 For example, Professor Lobel draws “New Governance” principles from the following strains
of thought:
[R]eflexive law, soft law, collaborative governance, democratic experimentalism,
responsive regulation, outsourcing regulation, reconstitutive law, post-regulatory
law, revitalizing regulation, regulatory pluralism, decentering regulation, metaregulation, contractarian law, communicative governance, negotiated governance,
destabilization rights, cooperative implementation, interactive compliance, public
laboratories, deepened democracy and empowered participatory governance,
pragmatic lawyering, nonrival partnership, and a daring legal system.

Lobel, supra note 4, at 345–47 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Bradley C.
Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. Rev. 471, 473 (2004) (criticizing the term “New Governance” as
overbroad).
18

Other scholars use different formulations and definitions. E.g., Lobel, supra note 4, at 405
(describing eight organizing principles of New Governance); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
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Participatory governance has broad appeal both domestically and
internationally,19 in part because it reflects certain ideals of democratic
theory, such as civic engagement and self-determination.20 Today,
participatory governance principles are put into practice in innumerable
and diverse contexts, including environmental law,21 police reform,22
financial regulation,23 global internet coordination,24 and human rights.25
Legal scholars have documented many successful examples of the use of
participatory approaches to improve conditions for marginalized
stakeholders, including a university initiative to increase gender
diversity;26 OSHA’s use of input from factory workers to reduce workplace
injuries by almost fifty percent;27 and a statewide initiative that instituted
meaningful reforms with respect to wrongful convictions.28

Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 79 (2011) (describing four
guiding principles for democratic experimentalism).
19 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 645 (2000);
Lobel, supra note 4, at 374–76, 394; Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council’s Duty to Decide, 4 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 320, 380–81 (2013).
20 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288–89 (1998) (defining the aim of democratic experimentalism as “to change the
reasons and evidence produced in public debate, and with them the conditions for participation in
civic life, so that our disputatious democracy is made both more effective as an instrument of public
problem solving and more faithful to its purpose of assuring the self-determination of free and equal
citizens”); Lobel, supra note 4, at 384 (“The aspiration of the governance model is that increased
engagement will contribute to the building of deliberative and collaborative capacities, thus
sustaining an environment for democratic engagement.”).
21 E.g., Lobel, supra note 4, at 423 (“Environmental law has been at the forefront of new
governance experiments.”); Anne E. Simon, Valuing Public Participation, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 757, 757
(1999).
22 E.g., K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control,
108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 682 (2020); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of
Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376–77 (2010).
23 See, e.g., Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial
Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 442.
24 See, e.g., ICANN History Project, ICANN, https://perma.cc/TA8Z-FSP4 (providing a history of
ICANN); What the Ombudsman Can Do for You, ICANN, https://perma.cc/FE8E-DW8F.
25

E.g., Tim Wood, Reinforcing Participatory Governance Through International Human Rights
Obligations of Political Parties, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 147, 148 (2015).
26 Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 250 (2006).
27 Lobel, supra note 4, at 418–19 (citing workplace safety studies reporting an almost fifty
percent reduction in incidents where New Governance methods were used).
28

Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 648–49.
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The desire to incorporate stakeholder voices into institutional
decision-making29 is grounded in the idea that the people directly affected
by a problem should have significant say in defining both the causes of
that problem and how it should be solved.30 Participatory governance is a
reaction, in part, to bureaucratic or technocratic decision-making, which
concentrates decision-making in the hands of a few so-called experts who
are often divorced from the lived experiences of those they regulate.31 In
contrast, participatory governance involves stakeholders in identifying
problems and solutions.32 Stakeholder involvement continues even after a
new regulatory or policy scheme is established, since ongoing monitoring,
feedback, and adjustment is necessary to ensure that the new scheme truly
addresses stakeholder needs.33 Participatory governance systems therefore
also involve stakeholders in assessing whether implemented reforms are
working and whether further adjustments are needed, using an ongoing
monitoring and accountability process referred to as “learning by doing.”34
Participatory governance schemes are theoretically appealing to
those who believe that empowering local residents to engage directly with
their government will improve policy and increase accountability.35
Democratic theorists such as John Dewey are often cited for the notion
that the sharing of ideas from a broadly inclusive stakeholder community
ultimately leads to more informed decision-making, empowers

29

See Lobel, supra note 4, at 344–45.

30

See, e.g., Ford, supra note 23, at 483–84 (discussing “continuous self-assessment” in the field
of securities regulation); Lobel, supra note 4, at 355–56 (describing the motivations of a participationbased governance model); Melish, supra note 4, at 58 (arguing that “the needs, experiences, and
priorities of those most affected by social welfare policy [be] taken directly into account as a
mandatory part of policy formulation and assessment”).
31 See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 90 (emphasizing that beneficiaries of social welfare
programs “have information essential to [the] diagnosis and planning” of those programs).
32 Lobel, supra note 4, at 377; Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323,
333–34 (2009).
33

See NeJaime, supra note 32, at 333–34.

34

Ford, supra note 23, at 445–46.

35

See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 239, 292 [hereinafter Bach, Governance]; Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power:
Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 275, 317–18
(2009) [hereinafter Bach, Welfare Reform]; Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance:
Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP.
RESOL. 269, 307–08 (arguing that “public voice, not only in the form of interest groups and
stakeholders, but also through direct civic engagement of citizens and residents, can address emerging
concerns about accountability”).
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marginalized stakeholders by valuing their input and perspectives, and
promotes ideals of self-determination and an engaged citizenry.36
While many laud participatory systems, it is also true that these
systems can be appallingly ineffective.37 Participatory systems too
frequently solicit constituent input yet ultimately disregard it, resulting in
procedures that are merely cosmetic and that produce no meaningful
reform or benefit.38 When stakeholders are asked to participate, but their
input fails to influence the outcome, the participatory process becomes
cosmetic, such that the process provides a “thin veneer of symbolic
conformance” with participatory governance principles but is “unlikely to
shift . . . existing dominant culture or norms of practice.”39 This is
especially problematic for constituents who lack traditional forms of
power40 and whose marginalization from traditional problem-solving
processes is the very harm that broadly inclusive participatory structures
are meant to remedy.41 Cosmetic processes thus cause dual harm to
marginalized constituents; they not only fail to meet the needs of those

36

E.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1076, 1099, 1100–01 (2004); see also William H. Simon, Solving
Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127,
131 (2004).
37 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 23, at 477–80, 484–86; Michele E. Gilman, Five Privacy Principles
(from the GDPR) the United States Should Adopt to Advance Economic Justice, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 368, 437–
39 (2020) (discussing “many barriers to effective public participation that must be addressed to ensure
that participation is meaningful, rather than mere window dressing”); Lee, supra note 4, at 413–17;
NeJaime, supra note 32, at 327, 329, 347–48; Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391,
406 (2016) (explaining that participatory structures may mean shutting out the “disempowered”);
David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 559–63 (2008); Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission Alternatives, 39 HARV.
ENV’T L. REV. 457, 462 (2015) (“FERC’s heavy reliance on participatory reforms to promote nontransmission alternatives pays lip service to these alternatives without meaningfully changing
planning processes.”).
38 See Lee, supra note 4, at 414–15; NeJaime, supra note 32, at 362 (“[P]articipatory structures may
rhetorically include disempowered stakeholders but actually cede little or no power.”).
39 MARIAN BARNES, JANET NEWMAN & HELEN SULLIVAN, POWER, PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL
RENEWAL: CASE STUDIES IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 192 (2007).
40 See, e.g., Bach, Welfare Reform, supra note 35, at 277–78 (“[T]he history of subordination and
disproportionate power that characterizes social welfare history raises serious questions about the
ability of poor communities to participate effectively . . . .”).
41

See id.; see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 83 (1997) (“Some critics worry that collaborative processes might be vehicles through which
agencies, industry, and powerful public interest groups can collude to undermine the public interest.
Rather than provide an alternative to interest representation, these processes might exacerbate all of
its weaknesses.”).
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whom they are meant to serve, but they further alienate and subordinate
them by falsely claiming to address those needs.42
The core of many critiques is that participatory governance systems
generally fail to benefit marginalized constituents because they do not
address preexisting power imbalances.43 Traditional participatory
governance systems seek to build consensus, through deliberative
discussion, among a wide range of stakeholders who hold diverse
perspectives and interests.44 It is argued that by inviting previously
unheard voices to the table, those in power will become educated on the
unaddressed needs and perspectives of other stakeholders and ultimately
be moved to alter the status quo in ways that address those needs.45 To
critics, however, in practice this roundtable process amounts to little more
than a negotiation that favors those who come to the table with
preexisting power.46
42 See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 22, at 698 (“The dialectical relationship between
structural inequalities and political power compounds this difficulty: multiple layers of democratic
and structural exclusion reinforce each other, reproducing unequal, racialized systems of justice and
of governance. . . . The antidemocratic nature of our legal systems reinforces structural inequality; the
result is that increasing community participation does not, on its own, truly tackle these deeply
embedded structural problems.”); see also Gráinne de Búrca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An
Introduction, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227, 236 (arguing that “the democratic promise of new governance is
hollow”); Freeman, supra note 41, at 83; Joel Handler, Orly Lobel, Elizabeth Mertz, Edward Rubin &
William Simon, A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New
Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479, 510 (describing cosmetic
processes as a “charade” and “cruel”); Lee, supra note 4, at 406, 415.
43 Lee, supra note 4, at 413–15; NeJaime, supra note 32, at 362; see also Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation,
Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 530 (2008) (critiquing New
Governance scholars’ “faith . . . in the potential for new negotiated configurations of individual and
collective interests to neutralize entrenched power hierarchies”). See generally Angela M. Gius,
Dignifying Participation, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 57 n.36 (2018) (explaining power is the
“the capacity and ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events” (quoting
Power, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2013))).
44 Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic Practice, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 109, 129–30 (2005).
45 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 20, at 288, 320–23 (“[W]orkable, long-term collaboration can
issue from, and aid the construction of, the institution of problem-solving deliberation itself. Facing
urgent problems that none can solve alone and seeking methods of establishing joint accountability,
parties will often prefer to explore a potential solution, even if they are unsure of its outcome, than to
do nothing. . . . Once begun, pragmatic problem solving loosens the hold of interest by fitfully darting,
as it were, beyond its reach, thereby discovering solutions bit by bit in the unfamiliar territory beyond
the reach of bounded rationality and habitual calculations of advantage.”).
46

See, e.g., Gius, supra note 43, at 58 (“[There is] a real concern that participatory processes are
too often driven by idealistic beliefs in the ‘transformative force of truth and justice’—the idea that
powerful institutions will change when confronted with the truth of marginalized peoples’ stories,
regardless of the group’s actual social power. . . . [T]his belief wrongly assumes that ‘problems in our
society occur because the ideas and experiences of oppressed people are excluded from democratic
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In sum, the primary concern is that a deliberative, consensus-seeking
structure simply replicates and reinforces existing power imbalances.
Even assuming the best of situations—where participants truly intend, in
good faith, to strive toward consensus and collective decision-making for
the benefit of the disempowered47—a consensus model remains highly
vulnerable to cosmeticism if powerful parties lack sufficient incentive to
compromise with those who have less power.48 More powerful
participants are also likely to disregard the input of others who are
traditionally marginalized on the basis of class, race, culture, educational
status, and other customary markers of legitimacy.49 In short, the same
qualities that marginalize certain stakeholders in the first place are likely
to continue to subordinate them even after they are “invited to the table.”
The worst-case scenarios are even more concerning since they involve
deliberate abuse of the participatory process. An institution that does not
truly wish to make change may engage in a cosmetic process with corrupt
intent, so that it may tout the outcome as having been vetted by a broad
range of stakeholders, while in reality using the process to simply
legitimize a preordained agenda.50
In either situation—whether there is sincere intent but unaddressed
power imbalances, or corrupt intent—cosmetic processes result. Cosmetic

debate and not because of a struggle between groups of people with competing interests.’” (footnote
omitted)); Simonson, supra note 37, at 405–06 (stressing that the focus on consensus and deliberation
over pluralism means shutting out the disempowered).
47

See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Inner-City Anti-Poverty Campaigns, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1374, 1433,
1461 (2017) (“Even equity-driven . . . participation schemes falter . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
48 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 494, 528–29 (2003).
49 Lee, supra note 4, at 414–16 (“That poor people have struggled to make a meaningful impact
through participatory processes is not surprising, given that these processes ambitiously rely on
groups with little power to successfully challenge entrenched interests and institutions using only a
negotiations framework that does not correct for power imbalances. [Participatory governance]
envisions that participants with power will alter dominant norms and practice based on the input of
those traditionally holding little or no influence. It asks powerful actors to share their power with
marginalized groups, to overcome cognitive and other biases that protect the status quo, and to
sacrifice selfish interests in favor of policies that benefit less powerful groups or some notion of the
‘public good.’” (footnotes omitted)).
50 See NeJaime, supra note 32, at 360 (“[Participatory] governance may offer a way to legitimate
the insider group’s agenda.”); see also BARNES ET AL., supra note 39, at 192 (discussing “coercive
isomorphism” and the likelihood that institutions may “go through the motions of public
participation and involvement because they are likely to be judged on their record of doing so.”
(citation omitted)); Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times: Can New
Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
323, 337 (2007); Super, supra note 37, at 554–55.
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processes invariably favor those already in power51 and not only fail to
achieve good-governance aims, but affirmatively subvert them by
“reinscrib[ing] existing power dynamics, allowing the ‘haves’ to come out
ahead”52 and producing “a vicious cycle . . . tilting more and more
entitlements in favor of those already in power.”53 Scholars have long
recognized these concerns54 but have not yet articulated an effective
means to address them.55 Accordingly, the CE Model seeks to reduce the
likelihood of cosmetic processes by shifting power to marginalized
constituents and eliminating the reliance on consensus-based
negotiations, among other things.56
The following discussion presents the CE Model, as adopted in the
City of Baltimore, Maryland, with the purpose of forcing large-scale
reform at a local governmental agency that has long been unresponsive to
constituent needs and resistant to more traditional forms of
accountability. Baltimore presents a test case that is both difficult and
regrettably common, and thus constitutes an appropriate laboratory in
which to “stress-test” participatory governance theory. The remainder of
Part I presents the difficult case of Baltimore’s water utility, explains how
traditional accountability tools have failed, and illustrates the
susceptibility of traditional participatory governance systems to
cosmeticism. Part II discusses the alternative approach of the CE Model

51

See Krawiec, supra note 48, at 494; NeJaime, supra note 32, at 348 (discussing the role of
lawyers in participatory governance).
52

NeJaime, supra note 32, at 359.

53

Lobel, supra note 4, at 458.

54

See, e.g., Ford, supra note 23, at 477; Freeman, supra note 41, at 83 (explaining that “[s]ome
critics worry that collaborative processes might be vehicles through which agencies, industry, and
powerful public interest groups can collude to undermine the public interest”); Krawiec, supra note
48, at 542 (stating that where law is incomplete, there is a “political opportunity for those with a stake
in regulation to push their agenda through renegotiation during the implementation and
enforcement phases of governance by constructing a gap-filling interpretation that serves the group’s
self-interest”); McFarlane, supra note 16, at 926 (“[P]articipation inevitably leads to either a shift in
power or to exclusion. And exclusion is more likely a natural or inevitable result because a shift in
power so clearly threatens to disrupt an otherwise settled, and often privatized, process.”); Sabel &
Simon, supra note 36, at 1100 (discussing how “dynamics of unequal bargaining power affect . . .
negotiations”); Super, supra note 37, at 555; Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and
Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation,
62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 850–51, 854–55 (2010).
55

Professors Jocelyn Simonson and K. Sabeel Rahman have explored the alternative approach
of promoting contestation, rather than consensus. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 22, at 689–94
(“[F]or such participatory institutions to generate real power, they may need to focus less on mere
information-gathering or consensus, and more on engaging and structuring productive forms of
contestation, where there is real power at stake.”); Simonson, supra note 37, at 722–23.
56 See infra Part II.
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and its three primary conceptual components, as illustrated through the
Baltimore case study.
B. The Difficult Case Study: The Recalcitrant and Unresponsive
Local Agency
In Baltimore, the public water supply is controlled by the Department
of Public Works (“DPW”), which ensures that water is safe to drink and
can be delivered to customers.57 Like other water utilities around the
country, DPW has the power to deny water service if a customer has not
paid her bill,58 leading to inhumane conditions that threaten the health
and safety of both individuals and the greater public.59 Prior to 2019,
unpaid water bills in Baltimore could trigger another severe penalty:
losing one’s house through the state-sponsored tax sale foreclosure
system—by which liens for unpaid bills are imposed on homes then
auctioned to the highest bidder, who may eventually foreclose and take
possession of the home60— which deprives individuals of not only their
shelter but of their equity invested into the home.61 The denial of water
service and the loss of one’s home are draconian and inhumane measures
that result in wealth stripping and community clearance, yet water
shutoffs and tax sale foreclosures are common sanctions for unpaid water
bills in many jurisdictions around the country.62
Baltimore low-income water customers are especially vulnerable to
these injustices. A typical Baltimore household’s annual bill for water
service more than quadrupled between 2000 and 2017, from $177 to $788,
and is expected to be over $1,100 by 2022.63 The high price of water is
57

BALT., MD., CITY CHARTER art. VII, §§ 27–46 (2020).

58

BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 4-3 (2020); see BALT., MD., CITY CHARTER art. VII, § 45.

59

Joan Jacobson, Keeping the Water On: Strategies for Addressing High Increases in Water and Sewer
Rates for Baltimore’s Most Vulnerable Customers, ABELL REP., Nov. 2016, at 8–12; cf. Elizabeth Mack &
Andy Henion, Affordable Water in US Reaching a Crisis, MICH. STATE UNIV. (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://perma.cc/U2W9-4NZL.
60 See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-833 (West 2015) (setting forth tax sale provisions); see also
JOAN JACOBSON, THE STEEP PRICE OF PAYING TO STAY: BALTIMORE’S TAX SALE, THE RISKS TO
VULNERABLE HOMEOWNERS, AND STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS 9–11 (2014). For more on tax
sale processes and their harms generally, see JOHN RAO, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE OTHER
FORECLOSURE CRISIS: PROPERTY TAX LIEN SALES (2012).
61

JACOBSON, supra note 60, at 3.

62

See id. at 7, 17–18, 24; see also RAO, supra note 60, at 4, 8, 10, 32.

63

ROGER COLTON, FISHER, SHEEHAN & COLTON, BALTIMORE’S CONUNDRUM: CHARGING FOR
WATER / WASTEWATER SERVICES THAT COMMUNITY RESIDENTS CANNOT AFFORD TO PAY 4 (2017); Five
Reasons Baltimore Needs an Income-Based Water Affordability Program, FOOD & WATER WATCH (Aug.
2017) [hereinafter Five Reasons], https://perma.cc/GLC8-J93H; see also Mary Grant, Baltimore City,
Maryland: A Case Study in the Fight for Water Justice (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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commonly blamed on a range of financial factors. Reagan-era cuts in
federal financial support for water infrastructure have led to decades of
deferred maintenance that can no longer be put off.64 Baltimore is also
subject to a federal consent decree requiring it to pay significant fines for
violating water cleanliness standards; the consent has been in place for a
decade and is understood to be a factor in the high price of water.65
Moreover, a Baltimore charter provision requires that the water utility be
financially self-sufficient,66 so that it cannot rely on the general City
budget to subsidize its operations, which makes it heavily dependent on
user fees. Some of these factors are common contributors to high water
prices in many American cities,67 while others are unique to Baltimore. All
are widely considered to be reasons that nearly 80,000 households in the
City, or roughly thirteen percent, cannot afford running water under the
United Nations’ standard of water affordability.68
In addition to the core problem of unaffordability, Baltimore
residents also suffer from an astonishingly inept and unresponsive
bureaucracy. Water customers routinely experience bills that skyrocket
from one month to the next with no apparent explanation.69 News media,
64

COTY MONTAG, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., WATER/COLOR: A STUDY OF RACE &

THE WATER AFFORDABILITY CRISIS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 13–15 (2019).
65 Id. at 33.
66

BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 3-5(a)(1) (2020).

67

See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 59, at 4; Mack & Henion, supra note 59 (“If water rates continue
rising at projected amounts, the number of U.S. households unable to afford water could triple in five
years, to nearly 36 percent, finds new research by a Michigan State University scholar.”); see also Sarah
Holder, The Overlooked Problem that Is Putting Thousands of Americans Underwater, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
17, 2017, 11:29 AM), https://perma.cc/VDG2-TACF.
68

See Jacobson, supra note 59, at 4–5. According to the affordability metric set forth by the
United Nations, water bills are usually unaffordable “if they exceed 3% of household income.” Five
Reasons, supra note 63. For a discussion about the human right to water and the need for legislation
to implement a new constituent commitment to water, see Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Constitutive
Commitment to Water, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 159, 162 (2016).
69 See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., BALT. CITY, NO. 20-00400-I, CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION 1 (2020) (explaining that “there are thousands of digital water meters in the City and
the County that are not fully functional”); Doug Donovan, Baltimore Erred in Selling Stadiums’ Debt,
BALT. SUN (May 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/23R7-QQYH (explaining that the Orioles’ spokesperson
had “no evidence that those bills [were] correct” and that the Orioles “[hadn’t] been getting bills on a
monthly basis”); Ian Duncan, DPW Boss Says Smart Meters Will Improve Baltimore Water Billing System
Within the Year, BALT. SUN (May 31, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://perma.cc/Q9SY-RBFH (explaining that
“problems with bills . . . have long dogged the city and users” and that “Councilman Brandon Scott
said the issue was the top problem for his constituents”); Emily Opilo & Alex Mann, Report Finds
Broken Equipment, Unresolved Water Customer Complaints Cost Baltimore City, County Millions, BALT.
SUN (Dec. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/DK5J-WUK8 (explaining “[t]he city Department of Public Works
has long been plagued by water billing system problems” over the years); Yvonne Wenger, Unpaid
Water Bills Trigger Tax Sales for Baltimore Homeowners, BALT. SUN (May 5, 2017),
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customers at public hearings, and legal services organizations frequently
report stories of customers who inexplicably receive bills of $800, or
$2,000, or $5,000.70 Calls to DPW can result in hour-long hold times, and
if a representative is reached, the standard response is that the customer
is presumed to have a leak; that the customer must pay a plumber to fix
the leak before DPW will consider a bill adjustment; and that in the
meantime, the customer must simply pay the entire bill to avoid water
service being shut off and the threat of foreclosure.71 Customers who
cannot find a leak, or who suspect that their astronomical bill might be
caused by a problem with their meter or by a leak that the City is
responsible for fixing—a gushing fire hydrant down the block, for
example—are given the same message: the City’s meters are accurate and
that the problem, whether a leak or the customer’s careless overuse of
water, is solely the customer’s problem to fix.72
Customers who can scrape together the resources to pay their bill
often do so, even if they believe it is incorrect, because the alternative is to
risk a water shutoff or tax sale foreclosure. But payments made are
sometimes lost.73 Customers are also entitled to pay in installments or to
receive billing discounts based on age or medical hardship, which can be
helpful. But many eligible customers are not enrolled74 or are not told how

https://perma.cc/P7T2-JSHM (“The city’s had a history of water billing errors, such as sending
customers bills that were tens of thousands of dollars too high . . . .”); see also Jacobson, supra note 59,
at 10–11 (explaining various case studies of individuals having their water utilities shut off); Jeff Abell,
Water Customers Boiling with Frustration, FOX BALT. (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/2K86-LBLY
(explaining the outrage of individual customers at City Council hearings, including nearly two hours
of customer testimony at investigatory hearings).
70

See City Council Hearing; March 27, 2017, CHARM TV (Mar. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/XV2ZB29M; City Council Hearing; May 16, 2019, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/T8GK-NSEQ;
see also Ian Duncan, As Baltimore Council Weighs Tackling High Water Bills, Study Shows How Much
Customers Are Squeezed, BALT. SUN (Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/FGL6-5TVP; Paul Gessler, Sticker
Shock Hits Baltimore Residents as First Round of Water Bills Roll Out, CBS BALT. (Aug. 14, 2019, 11:20
PM), https://perma.cc/NC9S-W9NH; Mark Reutter, Today Your Water Bill Goes Up – Again, BALT.
BREW (Oct. 1, 2020, 7:24 AM), https://perma.cc/DB3D-UHWX; Yvonne Wenger, Clarke Wants
Hearings Restored for Water Bill Disputes, BALT. SUN (July 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/H7V8-26XE.
71 See Press Release, Balt. City Dep’t of Pub. Works, Delinquent Water Accounts Facing Turnoff
(Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Press Release, Delinquent Water Accounts Facing Turnoff ],
https://perma.cc/WZJ6-HABV; Duncan, supra note 69; Understanding Your Water Bill, BALT. CITY
DEP’T OF PUB. WORKS [hereinafter Understanding Your Water Bill], https://perma.cc/TK7G-KKMF.
72 Duncan, supra note 69. For more on the common widespread narrative of the “undeserving
poor,” which blames low-income individuals for causing their own subordination, see generally Jaime
Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97 (2016).
73

Warfield Curry, Testimony Before the Environment and Transportation Committee (Feb. 15,
2017) (on file with the author).
74 Jacobson, supra note 59, at 8.

1016

George Mason Law Review

[Vol. 28:3

much they owe and when, or that accepting an installment plan means
admitting liability for the entire bill.75
Customers who do manage to appeal their bills face other challenging
circumstances. The official appeals process has changed three times over
the past four years76 and has included, at various times, an informal
hearing process that had previously been deemed to violate due process,77
and an “escalation” process involving five successive levels of
bureaucracy.78 Disputes routinely take well over a year to resolve, if ever
resolved, even when a lawyer is available to assist.79 When an appeal is
ultimately denied, this fact is often not actually communicated to the
customer, nor is the rationale for the denial explained; the bills simply
continue to accrue.80
While the appeals process is woefully inadequate, an even more
fundamental problem is that many customers receive no response at all
from DPW.81 Dealing with DPW is so frustrating that some customers
simply choose to live without residential water service—paying gym fees,82
for example, so that they can attend to basic hygiene needs—rather than
risk incurring another inexplicable, impossibly expensive bill that may
never be addressed and could lead to foreclosure. Loss of water service not
only has clear public health consequences, as well as negative impacts on
75

Id. at 8–10.

76

See Requesting a Water Bill Adjustment, BALT. CITY DEP’T OF PUB. WORKS,
https://perma.cc/TNE3-6ZHX; see also Wenger, supra note 70 (providing additional context for water
bill hearings in Baltimore). Compare Yvonne Wenger, Advocates Decry Loss of Appeal Hearings in
Baltimore Water Billing Disputes, BALT. SUN (Feb. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/K3NM-SJM2 (explaining
how the hearing process was limited a few years ago), with Amira Hairston, Baltimore City Water Bill
Hearing Scheduled for Wednesday Afternoon, WMAR BALT. (Mar. 4, 2020 5:22 PM),
https://perma.cc/R9Z9-T23A (showing that individuals may obtain hearings now).
77 Mayor of Baltimore v. ISG Sparrows Point, LLC (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Nov. 4, 2011). An
unpublished opinion by the state’s intermediate appellate court laid the groundwork for judicial
review of disputes between a politically powerful institutional customer, in this case a steel plant, and
the Department. Id. at 12–16. The steel plant claimed it had been improperly billed and had been
unable to negotiate a resolution with the agency through its “informal conference” dispute resolution
procedure. Id. at 9. The court held that judicial review was not available under the state’s
administrative procedure act, but that the steel plant was entitled to the remedy of administrative
mandamus and that the utility’s procedures violated due process. Id. at 3. The court remanded the
case to the agency for a new hearing. Id. at 23–25.
78 Press Release, Balt. City Dep’t of Pub. Works, Water Billing Reviews (July 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/N56C-EWH9.
79 This is based on the author’s personal experience assisting individuals with resolving such
disputes.
80

Id.

81

See Opilo & Mann, supra note 69.

82

Jacobson, supra note 59, at 11 (discussing Amanam Williams’s struggle with water in her
southwest Baltimore home).
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the ability to work and attend school, but in some jurisdictions can also
impact a person’s custody of her children or lead to criminal charges.83
In Baltimore, as in many other jurisdictions,84 these impacts
disproportionately harm low-income, Black, and elderly people.85 A
sampling of eighty-two Baltimore homeowners who sought pro bono
legal assistance for tax sale concerns in 2014 revealed that most were Black
households living below the poverty line, almost half were elderly, and
nearly one-third self-reported as disabled.86 Tenants, many of whom are at
the bottom of the income scale, are especially vulnerable since every rate
hike hits those with lower incomes harder.87 Tenants routinely report that
water bills paid directly to the landlord are not remitted to the water
utility, resulting in a shutoff, and yet tenants have no recourse to the
appeals system or even to billing information without landlord approval.88
C. The Failure of Traditional Accountability Tools and the Need
for an Alternative
The remedies usually available to constituents when government
policies cause harm have so far been ineffective in Baltimore.89
Theoretically, the voting public can exert pressure on the elected official

83

MONTAG, supra note 64, at 28–29.

84

See, e.g., FOOD & WATER WATCH, AMERICA’S SECRET WATER CRISIS: NATIONAL SHUTOFF SURVEY
REVEALS WATER AFFORDABILITY EMERGENCY AFFECTING MILLIONS 7–8 (2018) (summarizing data
revealing the severe impact of water shutoffs on low-income people and people of color in different
localities); MONTAG, supra note 64.
85 See MONTAG, supra note 64, at 31, 71 (“Rising water and sewer rates are likely to
disproportionately impact communities of color.”); Martha F. Davis, Let Justice Roll Down: A Case Study
of the Legal Infrastructure for Water Equality and Affordability, 23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 355,
357–58 (2016) (examining “the ways in which federal and local civil rights laws provide an alternative
legal infrastructure to ensure baseline water and sanitation equality” and noting that “a growing body
of research . . . suggests that U.S. water and sanitation inequalities occur along lines of race, ethnicity,
or gender, or disparately affect people with disabilities”); see also Tom I. Romero, II, The Color of Water:
Observations of A Brown Buffalo on Water Law and Policy in Ten Stanzas, 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 329,
333 (2012) (positing “that water organizations and legal institutions are too often color-blind in their
legal and policy orientation”).
86 JACOBSON, supra note 60, at 3.
87
88

See MONTAG, supra note 64, at 31, 71.

Jacobson, supra note 59, at 10–11; Matt Hill & Zafar Shah, Water is a Basic Human Right,
Baltimore, BALT. SUN (Apr. 2, 2015, 2:22 PM), https://perma.cc/UK97-P39L. But see BALT., MD., CITY
CODE art. 24, § 2-1 (2020) (explaining recently enacted legislation providing tenants with standard
customer rights).
89 See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing “exit” and “voice” strategies for public reaction to
deterioration in business firms, and in general, to dissatisfaction with organizations).
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who oversees DPW to remove the department head or force substantive
changes in policy. In reality, three of the four Baltimore mayors who held
office in the past ten years have repeatedly supported rate hikes, kept the
water utility director in his position for nine of those ten years, and
implemented practically no meaningful long-term reform efforts with
respect to DPW’s treatment of customers.90 This is despite many hours of
angry constituent testimony at public hearings about unaffordable rates,
inexplicable and dramatic spikes in bills, and the utter futility of
attempting to work out solutions with DPW.91 The mayors and the utility
have implemented no meaningful, long-lasting reforms, despite
consistent press coverage of the issues by The Baltimore Sun and many

90 The first two of these three mayors did not undertake efforts toward reform of DPW during
their tenures. When the second mayor resigned in May 2019, she was replaced by Bernard “Jack”
Young, who had championed water utility reform legislation as Council president and who signed the
Water Accountability and Equity Act into law as Mayor in early 2020. See Archives of Maryland,
Historical List, Baltimore Mayors, 1797—, MD. STATE ARCHIVES, https://perma.cc/W336-HQTU; Water
Accountability and Equity Act, BALT. CITY COUNCIL [hereinafter Baltimore Water & Equity Act History],
https://perma.cc/U2QR-69MU. Young then indefinitely stayed the implementation of the Water
Accountability and Equity Act, citing the COVID-19 public health crisis. See Yvonne Wenger, Advocates
Decry Baltimore’s Delay in Implementing New Measures to Make Water More Affordable, BALT. SUN (July
13, 2020) [hereinafter Wenger, Advocates Decry Baltimore’s Delay], https://perma.cc/QNE2-FSH8.
Young did provide crucial relief to customers via a moratorium on water bills during the pandemic,
but it is unknown what will happen when this temporary measure is lifted. See Council President’s
COVID-19 Resources, BALT. CITY COUNCIL [hereinafter Council President’s COVID-19 Resources],
https://perma.cc/K8U5-X5CF. During Young’s tenure, the long-standing DPW Director in October
2019 also retired in the wake of ever-increasing scandals. The position was not filled until March 2021.
See Yvonne Wenger, Baltimore Longtime Public Works Director Chow to Retire Feb. 1, BALT. SUN (Oct. 17,
2019) [hereinafter Wenger, Baltimore Longtime Public Works], https://perma.cc/4WK7-T3YF; see also
Press Release, Off. of the Mayor, Balt., Md., Mayor Scott to Appoint Jason Mitchell Department of
Public Works Director (Mar. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/AX85-SYQL. Young’s successor, Brandon
Scott, also championed the water reform legislation as City Council President, but as mayor he has
not yet lifted the order delaying the legislation’s implementation. See Baltimore Water and Equity Act
History, supra; see also Rianna Eckel, Will Mayor Scott Finally Fix Baltimore’s Busted Water Billing
System?, BALT. BREW (Jan. 13, 2021, 10:50 AM), https://perma.cc/M6ZV-9JEC. While the new legislation
remains on hold, the utility has implemented a significantly less robust affordability initiative. See
Press Release, Balt. City Dep’t of Pub. Works, Department of Public Works Offering More Help for
More Customers with Baltimore H2O Assists (May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/3N4K-T225; Marcus
Dieterle, Baltimore to Offer Water Billing Discount for Unemployed Residents, But Advocates Say It Doesn’t
Go Far Enough, BALT. FISHBOWL (Apr. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/7T6K-97VK. Consequently, despite
the successful passage of a significant reform bill after many years of effort, it remains the case that
no meaningful, long-lasting reform has yet been implemented on the ground.
91

See Reutter, supra note 70. There were public hearings held on Oct. 26, 2016, May 27, 2017,
and May 16, 2019, each the product of the activities of a coalition of lawyers and policy organizations.
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other media outlets;92 attention from state legislators;93 public testimony
by other City agencies as to the harms caused to the City’s most vulnerable
residents; continuous efforts at legislative reform over the course of four
years by a coalition of lawyers and policy organizations;94 and multiple
research reports published by the NAACP95 and the Abell Foundation96
highlighting the injustices of the situation. Despite these multifaceted and
persistent efforts to motivate change, the electorate’s rage and its voting
power have proven largely impotent.97
Other accountability mechanisms traditionally used in the face of
such governmental intransigence might include lawsuits and
administrative law remedies.98 But lawsuits require abundant resources
unavailable to the vast majority of individual customers and the legal
services organizations who represent them.99 Moreover, even the one
successful lawsuit establishing the right of customers to sue for inaccurate
billings and due process violations failed to create positive change for
more than the individual plaintiff, as the litigation did not spark reform
92

See Abell, supra note 69; Donovan, supra note 69; Duncan, supra note 69; Opilo & Mann, supra
note 69; Wenger, supra note 69.
93 One concrete reform enacted at the state level is that unpaid water bills no longer provide
grounds for a tax sale of property. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-849.1 (West 2017).
94 The author is a member of the Baltimore Right to Water Coalition, which first drafted reform
legislation in 2017. The legislation, the Water Accountability and Equity Act (Balt., Md., Ordinance
20-336 (Jan. 27, 2020)), was officially introduced in December 2018 and signed into law in early 2020.
See Baltimore Water & Equity Act History, supra note 90. Because DPW missed its implementation
deadline in July 2020, amendments were introduced in the fall of 2020 and signed into law in
December 2020. See Water Accountability and Equity Act - Modifications, BALT. CITY COUNCIL
https://perma.cc/LNS6-YC3M; see also Balt., Md., Ordinance 20-468 (Dec. 7, 2020). Implementation
is presently scheduled to be phased in beginning in January 2021, with full implementation by July of
2021, assuming that the stay currently imposed because of the coronavirus pandemic is lifted. See Balt.,
Md., Ordinance 20-336, § 5 (Jan. 27, 2020); Zafar Shah & Matan Zeimer, Baltimore Mayor Young Took
Away Water Bill Protections When Residents Needed Them Most, BALT. SUN (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5F9K-3QJX (noting the impact that COVID-19 measures have had on the Water
Accountability and Equity Act implementation). The final law as amended establishes the following
changes within the Baltimore City DPW: (1) an income-based water affordability structure, which caps
water bills at a certain percentage of the customer’s income should that income fall below a certain
threshold; (2) a multifaceted dispute resolution process through which customers may challenge
adverse actions taken against them by the agency; and (3) a participatory governance system designed
to combat cosmeticism and to establish long-term systemic reforms with respect to how the agency
treats customers. See BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-6, 2-17 to -22 (2020).
95

E.g., MONTAG, supra note 64.

96

E.g., JACOBSON, supra note 60; Jacobson, supra note 59.

97

See Eckel, supra note 90; Wenger, Advocates Decry Baltimore’s Delay, supra note 90; Wenger,
Baltimore Longtime Public Works, supra note 90; cf. Baltimore Water & Equity Act History, supra note 90.
98 Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1016–18.
99

See id. at 1058–59.
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by DPW or additional lawsuits that might increase pressure for reform.100
Theoretically, while such a ruling should incentivize the implementation
of adequate billing and dispute resolution mechanisms, ten years after
that ruling the water utility still has promulgated neither.101
Administrative law tools intended to enhance government’s
responsiveness to its constituents have similarly afforded no relief.
Traditional notice-and-comment procedures, for example, invite public
input and require agencies to consider that input before finalizing their
rules and regulations.102 Even such limited participation has not been
available to Baltimore water customers, however, as the utility was not,
until recently, subject to a state or local administrative procedures act
regime.103
The reasons for a public agency’s non-responsiveness to its
constituents are difficult to pinpoint with precision. In Baltimore, they
appear to include the utility’s financial need, a narrative that shifts blame
for water billing problems away from the utility and onto customers, and
ineffective political and legal accountability mechanisms. Regardless of
the exact reasons, when traditional accountability tools are insufficient, it
is necessary to explore alternatives. The next Section discusses the
potential alternative of employing a traditional participatory governance
process for this situation and highlights both its strengths and its
weaknesses.
D. The Participatory Governance Alternative and its Vulnerability
to Cosmeticism
If an idealized version of traditional participatory governance process
were to be implemented in Baltimore, it might look like the hypothetical
posed below. This hypothetical scenario demonstrates how broad
constituent input could be used to solve problems and impose
accountability. It also illustrates how traditional participatory systems,
even when robustly implemented, remain highly vulnerable to cosmetic
outcomes, and thus demonstrates the need to improve the theoretical
model.
Consider the following hypothetical. With the goals of using public
input to reform its policies and practices and to better respond to
consumer needs, the water utility embarks on a series of “town halls” and

100

See Mayor of Baltimore v. ISG Sparrows Point, LLC, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Nov. 4, 2011).

101

See Eckel, supra note 90; Wenger, Advocates Decry Baltimore’s Delay, supra note 90; Wenger,
Baltimore Longtime Public Works, supra note 90; cf. Baltimore Water & Equity Act History, supra note 90.
102 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
103

BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17 to -23 (2020).
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“focus groups.” Many gatherings are convened throughout the City in
order to encourage broad participation, including at established and
trusted local community organizations like churches and businesses. For
those with mobility or other restrictions, ample alternatives include
phone banks, mail, an online system, and trained door-to-door canvassers.
Special efforts are made to reach heavily impacted and traditionally
underrepresented groups, such as tenants, elderly Black homeowners, and
people of lower incomes.
Staff and leadership from all relevant government agencies are also
consulted: the water utility, the finance and billing department, and
human services agencies who support clients harmed by water utility
practices.
Stakeholder gatherings emphasize face-to-face discussions, with the
explicit goals of airing grievances, identifying challenges, and exploring
diverse perspectives, as well as possible causes of the problems and
potential reforms. Ideas on many topics are documented, from customer
service issues to billing problems, to affordability levels, to water
conservation techniques.
As discussions proceed, common issues and ideas rise to the forefront.
Certain community leaders and organizations surface as appropriate
representatives or “proxies” for different stakeholder communities.
Proxies and other key stakeholders dive deeper in smaller discussion
groups with the government, with the goal of gaining consensus among
all stakeholders on how to go about addressing the problems of
affordability and customer service.
After significant debate and discussion, consensus emerges on
solutions to common problems. Participants then turn to the specifics of
program design and execution, collectively working to define best
practices for implementation and metrics by which to gauge success. The
“learning by doing” process then begins, meaning that the water utility,
customers, and other stakeholders each scrutinize new programs as they
roll out and provide feedback on both their effectiveness and their flaws.104
In response to this feedback, the water utility continually refines the
programs. Thus, if a new affordability program does not adequately enroll
tenants, for example, the problem is uncovered early on and the new
program is modified until tenant enrollment is satisfactory to all groups.
Ultimately, after many months or years of robust participation by
stakeholders to shape and continually refine the reforms, the reforms
meet the agreed-upon metrics of success and the participatory process
comes to an end.

104

Ford, supra note 23, at 445–46.
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If this idealized hypothetical seems implausible on many levels, it is
because it reveals the challenges inherent to participatory governance
systems as currently conceived. This vision assumes that the utility will
sincerely seek constituent input and incorporate that input into policy
reforms, despite DPW’s long history of refusing to do just that. It
illustrates the power imbalance between a public services institution that
controls vital resources and all decision-making, and its captive and
powerless customers. It demonstrates how success of a traditional
participatory system depends on robust, sustained, and voluntary
engagement by customers with the utility, even though customers have
no reason to believe that their input would be respected or result in
meaningful change.
A cosmetic retelling of the Baltimore hypothetical is much easier to
imagine. Such a cosmetic version of the story could take many forms. In
one version, for example, the convenings of stakeholders across the City
might not be widely advertised, or might be scheduled at inconvenient
locations and times, leading to low turnout. The utility would then
announce that although it attempted to work with customers, customers
did not adequately respond, and therefore, it cannot pursue reforms. The
result is cosmetic, since there is no meaningful change generated in
response to public input.
Another cosmetic story is also easy to imagine. In this version, the
participatory process appears at first to be successful. As in the initial
telling, broad public input is carefully collected, then stakeholder
representatives and the utility discuss the possible solutions of
implementing an affordability program and other goals to address various
stakeholder needs. The process turns cosmetic, however, when the utility
simply decides not to implement the solutions suggested during the
process—citing budgetary reasons, for example. The utility instead makes
only minor adjustments designed to satisfy the most influential or vocal
stakeholders, such as commercial businesses, while publicly announcing
that the process has been a success, even though the needs of marginalized
constituents remain unaddressed.
These imagined stories of how a traditional participatory process
might play out in the Baltimore water context highlight its vulnerability
to cosmeticism and the need for a revamped model.
II. Turning Participation into Power: The CE Model
Participatory structures must be constructed in a way that combats
the risk of cosmeticism, even when dealing with a highly recalcitrant
actor. Since the primary vulnerability of traditional processes lies in the
failure to address power imbalances, the revamped model must address
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this problem by affirmatively shifting power to constituent voice. The CE
Model accomplishes this power shift through three essential elements:
operationalized participation, constituent primacy, and structural
accountability.
To illustrate these components, this Part first describes the need for a
strong “executor” who can incentivize the institution to listen to
constituents and engage in reform. It next briefly describes the structure
adopted in Baltimore. Finally, it explains in detail how each of the three
elements of the CE Model function to combat cosmeticism by shifting
power to constituent voice.
A. The Prerequisite: A Strong Executor Who Shifts Power to
Marginalized Constituents
To thwart cosmetic outcomes, the more powerful must be
incentivized to attend to the needs of the less powerful. The CE Model, as
applied in Baltimore, was designed with this goal in mind.
As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that good intent is not
necessarily required for a participatory process to succeed. This author has
previously argued that even when powerful actors are disinclined to
engage in a participatory process and address the needs of the less
powerful, they will still do so, as long as the undertaking will benefit them
in some way.105 Good intent is thus unnecessary if all participants are
otherwise strongly incentivized to achieve a common goal and recognize
how other participants will contribute to achieving that goal.106 These two
requirements are the baseline conditions necessary for a participatory
system to succeed.107 In short, if these conditions exist, then the balance of
power shifts because there is reason for traditionally empowered parties
to modify their actions based on the needs of the traditionally
disempowered.108
What do the baseline conditions suggest about the chances of success
in Baltimore? Given DPW’s longstanding refusal to address customer
needs, a participatory process might seem destined to fail, but the
baseline-conditions analysis suggests otherwise. First, customers and the
water utility are both, in fact, incentivized toward a common goal: getting
105

This formulation slightly recasts the test presented in the author’s earlier article. This revised
formulation does not require the parties to recognize mutual benefits; rather, every party must each
recognize a clear benefit to itself. See Lee, supra note 4, at 420.
106 See id. at 422.
107
108

See id. at 422–23.

See Gius, supra note 43, at 57 n.36, 58–59, 64–65 (“[D]efining power as the ‘the ability or
capacity to do something or act in a particular way’ and ‘the capacity and ability to direct or influence
the behavior of others or the course of events’” (citations omitted)).

1024

George Mason Law Review

[Vol. 28:3

water bills paid with minimum hassle and delay. The utility is incentivized
towards this end since it needs customer payments to function, and
customers are incentivized to avoid late fees and water shutoffs. Thus, the
first baseline condition exists. As to the second baseline condition,
customers recognize that DPW is necessary to achieving the goal of
making water bills easily payable, since DPW proposes rates and has
control over bill accuracy. DPW, unfortunately, does not reciprocate the
belief that both parties’ cooperation is necessary to achieve the goal;
rather, it believes that it is solely the customers’ responsibility to pay bills
on time.109 The second baseline condition, therefore, does not exist,
because DPW does not recognize that it must also address customers’
needs in order to realize the goal of getting bills paid.
Despite the failure of the baseline conditions test, however, a
participatory project may still succeed. Participatory theory holds out the
possibility that even if the baseline conditions are missing, they still may
be created or induced.110 Prior scholarship has identified a number of tools
that can be used to create the baseline conditions and thus, increase the
chance of a meaningful participatory process.111 Two specific tools
available to create the baseline conditions, and their relevance to the
Baltimore case study, are discussed below.
1. Destabilization as Incentive
One circumstance that can theoretically incentivize stakeholders
towards a joint undertaking is a “destabilizing event,” usually a highprofile event that dramatically and convincingly persuades both sides that
there is a problem that must be fixed and that the solution requires both
sides’ participation.112 Highly emotional City Council hearings, constant
press coverage of embarrassing problems, and the sheer volume of
consumer complaints might have incentivized the utility to change its

109

See Understanding Your Water Bill, supra note 71; see also Press Release, Delinquent Water
Accounts Facing Turnoff, supra note 71; Duncan, supra note 69. The water utility does not, for
example, accept the premise that it would benefit from more prompt bill payment if it accepted
customers’ demands for more affordable water rates and better service. The water utility has
consistently opposed implementing a program that makes water more affordable for customers and
simultaneously increases revenue for the utility. See COLTON, supra note 63, at 39–41 (discussing a
proposed program, based on a similar program designed for Philadelphia, that would make water bills
affordable for all Baltimoreans earning below 200% of the poverty level and would increase revenue
to the water utility, since customers are more willing and able to pay bills when they are affordable).
110 See Lee, supra note 4, at 422–24, 441.
111

Id.

112

See id. at 424; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1056, 1062, 1076–78.
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approach.113 In Baltimore, however, none of these events sufficiently
“destabilized” the status quo or moved the utility toward reform,114
because the utility’s power to refuse to listen remained absolute. These
events did, however, collectively move other powerful actors to impose
new structural incentives for reform, as described below.
2. Structural Incentive
Where destabilization does not incentivize a recalcitrant party to act,
coercion by a third party might.115 As explained by Professors William
Simon and Charles Sabel, one example is a judge who presides over a
dispute between two opposing sides.116 By imposing liability on one party,
the judge can force that party to enter into settlement negotiations with
the other side.117 In doing so, the judge creates a common goal that
benefits both sides: meeting some of the plaintiffs’ demands and thus
achieving settlement. This is a goal toward which both parties are
incentivized to work because, if they do not, the judge will impose a legal
remedy of her own design, which is likely to be less tailored to the parties’
specific needs and interests.118
The judge thus serves as what might be called an “executor” of the
participatory process, by imposing a mutual goal on the parties and
forcing them into that participatory process—specifically, negotiations
around the settlement table. This process forces even a highly recalcitrant
party to sit down with the other side, discuss the problem, and work
toward a solution that addresses the other party’s needs.119
In the context of DPW, the most obvious choice for an executor who
would force the utility to act is the mayor,120 since the mayor has the power
to fire the head of the water utility and otherwise force the utility to make
change. Yet various mayors of Baltimore refused to take on this role.121
113

See supra Section I.B.

114

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.

115

See Lee, supra note 4, at 424, 426–28. See generally JACOBSON, supra note 60; Jacobson, supra

note 59.
116

See Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1051, 1055–56.

117

Steven L. Schultz, Mass Torts: In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation:
Bankrupt and Backlogged – A Proposal for the Use of Federal Common Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58
BROOKLYN L. REV. 553, 612–14 (1992); see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1098.
118 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1099–100.
119
120

See id.

Some utilities are also subject to state regulators who might play this role. In Maryland, the
state utilities regulator has jurisdiction over only a small fraction of water services statewide. The
Water Division, MD. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/WFX6-QM3E.
121 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Instead, the role of executor has fallen to the Baltimore City Council,
which is empowered through its legislative powers to impose new
requirements on the water utility. After years of encouragement by
coalition members, in late 2019 the City Council unanimously voted to
pass legislation subjecting the utility to the CE Model framework
described in this Article, which forces DPW into a participatory
governance process with its constituents.122
In imposing the CE Model, the City Council—much like a judge that
has required litigants to enter into settlement discussions—has changed
the balance of power between the parties. How exactly the CE Model
shifts the balance of power between an agency and its constituents is the
focus of the remainder of this Article.
The Baltimore legislation has two major components. The first
component addresses the basic affordability of water by capping water
bills for those earning under two hundred percent of the poverty level at
three percent of the customer’s income, which meets the UN standard for
water affordability.123 The second component, which serves as the focus of
the case study of this Article, uses a revamped participatory governance
framework to improve how the utility treats the public and to increase its
responsiveness to customer concerns.
The basic mechanics of this framework, as adopted in Baltimore, are
described in the next Section. Subsequent Sections analyze the three
conceptual elements of this framework and how each one serves a specific
role in countering cosmeticism. The structure adopted in Baltimore is just
one example of how the conceptual components of the CE Model may be
carried out in a real-world context.
B. The CE Model: A Case Study
The CE Model adopted in Baltimore establishes an infrastructure for
two critical functions: resolving individual customer disputes and
reforming system-wide customer-facing policies. The CE infrastructure
for both of these functions combines somewhat familiar elements. The
dispute resolution process combines ombudsman-like functions with
traditional due process hearings to create a comprehensive system for
addressing individual customer-agency conflicts.124 The process for
revamping the utility’s customer-focused rules and regulations in some

122

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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Five Reasons, supra note 63; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text. According to the
United Nations, affordability means three percent of income. Five Reasons, supra note 63.
124

Ombudsman - Frequently Asked Questions, FINRA, https://perma.cc/NNK9-MFZX [hereinafter
Ombudsman - Frequently Asked Questions].
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ways resembles a traditional notice-and-comment process. However, the
CE Model deploys these familiar functions in new ways, transforming
them into participatory mechanisms.
1. Individual Dispute Resolution as Participatory Problem-Solving
Administrative agency practices often provide constituents a way to
dispute adverse actions taken against them by the agency. In the Baltimore
context, adverse actions include incorrect water bills, unjust service
shutoffs, a refusal to enroll a customer in a billing discount program, and
other actions.125 The CE Model as adopted in Baltimore provides
customers with various paths for resolving such disputes.
First, a customer may choose to work with the utility’s dispute
resolution process, which is likely to consist of speaking to customer
service representatives.126 Second, a customer may choose to work with
the newly created Office of Water Customer Advocacy and Appeals
(“Advocate”) to resolve the complaint.127 Third, the customer may
participate in a traditional due process administrative hearing,128 at which
both customers and the water utility can present and confront evidence
and witnesses, and where an adjudication is made. Fourth and finally, the
customer can appeal in court.129
The innovative and participatory component of this multitiered
system is the Advocate’s dispute resolution process, which is separate and
distinct from the more traditional due process hearings.130 The Advocate
process is more informal and involves both investigatory and problemsolving roles: the Advocate seeks to identify the root causes of the dispute,
to identify solutions for the customer that are workable for their particular
circumstances, and to prevent the problem from reappearing in the
future.131
This process is participatory in nature, as the Advocate may speak
with both customer and utility representatives to investigate the
circumstances of the dispute, explore its causes, generate solutions or
mitigating measures, and determine a resolution.132 For a customer with a

125

See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.

126

Customer service contact is traditionally the first step in DPW’s dispute process. See Press
Release, supra note 78.
127 See BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17, 2-19 to -20 (2020).
128

See id. § 2-21.

129

See id. § 2-21(i).

130

Id. §§ 2-17, 2-19 to -22.

131

Id. § 2-17(b)–(c).

132

Id. § 2-20.
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high water bill, for example, the Advocate might first investigate the
household’s billing history to see if the problem is systemic or sudden. It
might discuss with the customer water conservation measures, such as
how to fix common types of leaks.133 The Advocate might visit the
customer’s home to investigate the possibility of leaks, if appropriate, or it
might investigate other possible causes of the high bill—like a
malfunctioning meter or running fire hydrant—that the utility must fix.134
Similarly, for a customer denied enrollment in a discount program, the
Advocate might investigate whether the customer needs help in
completing the application, discuss informally with the water utility the
reasons for the denial, or interview the customer as to what type of
extended payment plan might be feasible for her.135
In this flexible and expansive investigatory and problem-solving role,
the Advocate functions somewhat like a traditional ombudsperson.136 The
Advocate uses diverse methods to investigate the root causes of the
problem, such as discussion with both parties, hands-on investigatory
techniques, and other forms of research.137 The Advocate also employs
various methods to help the customer and DPW move substantively
beyond the sticking point, so that the problem does not simply reappear
during the next billing cycle.138
Thus, the Advocate takes a very different approach to dispute
resolution than that encompassed by a standard adversarial
administrative due process hearing, which merely receives evidence and
adjudicates rights. The Advocate also differs from a traditional
ombudsperson, who usually is not empowered to order a resolution to the
dispute;139 the Advocate wields the power to substantively change the
133

See art. 24, § 2-17; Understanding Your Water Bill, supra note 71.

134

See art. 24, § 2-17.

135

See id. § 2-20.
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Ombudspersons are employed by innumerable organizations. Examples include nursing
homes, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) (an investment oversight organization
supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). About FINRA, FINRA, https://perma.cc/R9FV-W4LT; About the
Ombudsman Program, NAT’L CONSUMER VOICE FOR QUALITY LONG-TERM CARE,
https://perma.cc/WN93-ME8R; Ombudsman – Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 124; The ICANN
Ombudsman, ICANN, https://perma.cc/85GG-CMKL. See generally Eric S. Adcock, Federal Privilege in
the Ombudsman’s Process, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1 (2013); Kenneth Culp Davis, Book Review, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (1967) (reviewing WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966); WALTER
GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966)).
137 See art. 24, §§ 2-17 to -20.
138
139

See id. § 2-20(b)–(c).

Adcock, supra note 136, at 11 (the classical ombudsmen model, as adopted widely in the United
States, provides the ombudsman with no power to take action, make decisions, or order administrative
officials to take action).
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outcome by ordering the utility to lower a bill or take other steps to
remedy harm to the customer.140
In sum, the Advocate seeks input from both the customer and DPW
in order to explore the root causes of the dispute and to develop workable
solutions that might prevent the problem from recurring in the future.
2. Systemic Reform and Long-Term Accountability
The Advocate is also tasked with systemic problem-solving and
accountability functions. The Advocate is responsible for developing
system-wide proposals to improve how the water utility treats its
customers.141 These proposals must be based on what the Advocate has
learned from its experiences addressing customers’ complaints; it must
document and study what it learns from individual disputes, collect and
study data reported systemwide, and justify its reform proposals based on
the needs and concerns of constituents.142 Thus, constituent input, as
provided by individuals engaged in the dispute resolution process and as
represented by agency-wide data, directly shapes the proposals for agency
reform.
Once the Advocate drafts its proposals for reform, the proposals are
scrutinized during semi-annual public hearings.143 The hearings are hosted
by a Committee on Oversight, consisting of the Mayor, the City Council
President, the Inspector General, the City Auditor, and three city council
members.144 At the hearings, the participants analyze the proposed
reforms through the lens of how well those reforms respond to actual
customers’ experiences and promote the Advocate’s overall mission of
fairness to customers.145 The utility must respond to questions about the
proposals and address any objections or concerns, and the public may also
weigh in.146
The process of reforming the water utility’s rules and procedures is
thus transparent and public. It is not unlike traditional administrative
agency notice-and-comment rulemaking in this regard.147 Unlike standard
notice-and-comment procedures, however, in Baltimore the proposed
rules and policies must be derived from and must respond to concerns
140

BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 2-20(c) (2020).

141

See id. § 2-17(b)(2)(ii).
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Id. § 2-17(c)(3), (d).
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Id. §§ 2-17(c)(3), 2-23(e)(3).
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raised by the direct, personal experiences of constituents. Moreover, while
participants in traditional notice-and-comment procedures are often paid
insiders and technocrats, such as lobbyists, public hearings in Baltimore
are historically well-attended by City residents who are personally affected
by the utility’s practices.148 Rulemaking procedures are thus transformed
into participatory processes under the Baltimore CE Model.
In Baltimore, after reforms are adopted by the utility, the semi-annual
public hearings continue to provide the infrastructure for ongoing
“learning by doing.”149 This, too, deviates from standard rulemaking
procedures. The Advocate is required twice a year to report on whether
previously adopted reforms are working as intended, and if they are not,
to propose additional refinements or changes that would further improve
the system.150 The oversight committee may ask questions of the Advocate
and DPW, and members of the public can provide testimony, as well,151
providing a further accountability check and offering additional
constituent input on the issues at hand. The ongoing schedule of public
hearings provides continual monitoring, scrutiny, and adjustment of
revised rules and policies to ensure that these reforms are truly responsive
to constituent needs.
Taken together, these elements of the Baltimore CE Model—the
individual dispute resolution procedures and the process for system
reform—are designed to emphasize the three essential requirements of
constituent empowerment: operationalized participation, constituent
primacy, and structural accountability. All three are necessary152 to shift
power to constituent voice and to prevent cosmeticism. Each seeks to
shore up a weak spot that makes participatory schemes vulnerable.
The first element—operationalized participation—seeks to ensure
sufficient constituent input into the system, even when participants
distrust each other and are skeptical of the process. The second—
constituent primacy—shifts power to constituent input by requiring
decisionmakers to prioritize and respond to it, and by restricting their
ability to ignore it. The third—structural accountability—sets up
triggerable remedies if the participatory process does not respond

148

See Wenger, supra note 70 (showing support for hearings among Baltimore residents); see also
Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 90–91.
149 Ford, supra note 23, at 445–46.
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BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17(c)(3), 2-23(e)(3)(i) (2020).
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Id. § 2-23(e)(3)(ii).

152

While these elements are necessary for the system to succeed and their presence greatly
increases the likelihood of such success, they certainly do not assure success—they are necessary, but
not sufficient, for governmental reform. This is one reason that the CE Model is designed to work in
conjunction with other methods. See infra Section II.E.3.
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adequately to constituent needs. Each element is discussed below
conceptually and is also illustrated through the Baltimore example.
C. Concept One: Operationalized Participation
One of the greatest vulnerabilities of participatory systems is the risk
of insufficient participation by marginalized constituents.153 A
participatory system obviously cannot achieve its goals without robust
input from a broad range of stakeholders. Since traditional means of
gathering input can be costly and burdensome for all involved, especially
for marginalized constituents, these burdens must be lessened to
effectively operationalize broad participation (make it feasibly realized)
and to decrease the risk of a cosmetic outcome.154
Insufficient participation by marginalized communities has many
causes.155 Traditional methods of participation, such as listening sessions,
town halls, stakeholder surveys, and face-to-face meetings, demand a
substantial commitment of time and energy from both the agency and
from constituents.156 An agency that fails to dedicate the necessary
resources dooms the participatory project from the start. But even
adequate resources and good-faith intent on the part of the agency may
not be sufficient.157 For constituents who have historically been
marginalized from power, mistreated, or subordinated by cosmetic
participatory processes in the past, there is little or no reason to commit
their personal resources to a participatory effort.158 Consider, for example,
a water customer who was overbilled, whose was water was shut off
without cause, or worse, who has lost their home and who has tried
153

See Lee, supra note 72, at 136–37, 137 n.228 (positing that examples from participatory
processes in the public housing field indicate that constituents may be deterred from participating
due to concerns about co-optation, acquiescence, or domination by representatives).
154 Another benefit from less direct and intensive participation of the CE Model is that the model
does not affect the constituents’ ability to engage in more adversarial methods of claiming power. See
infra Section II.E.3.
155 See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 37, at 437–39.
156
157

See id. at 431–32.

See Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the Enforcement of
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 351, 417–18 (2008) (“Even
where the parties are committed to experimentalist solutions, and the appropriate architecture is in
place or created, experimentalist systems might fail to produce the best possible results. . . . Resourcerelated problems are likely to persist within, and undermine, an experimentalist system.” (footnote
omitted)).
158 See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 22, at 722 (“Power and participation are inextricably
linked: a sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than participation, while the existence
of power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so.” (quoting Gerald E. Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1980))).
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desperately to seek a response from DPW with no results. An invitation to
devote further time and energy to engage with DPW may well be viewed
with distrust and disinterest.
Thus, even when (or especially when) there is much to complain
about, robust constituent participation cannot be assumed. Not only does
inadequate participation make the participatory project impossible, but
the fact of failed participation can be used to justify the continuing
disregard of constituent interests, even if it arises from a lack of agency or
constituent resources or from past mistreatment. Inadequate
participation may thus be orchestrated and manipulated so as to
subordinate marginalized constituents further and justify perpetuation of
the status quo.159
For these reasons, it is a heavy lift to operationalize participation,
especially where both sides are predisposed to ignore each other. Yet it is
essential to the success of the system and thus requires creative design.
Two strategies that may help to operationalize constituent input are the
use of double-duty activities and proxies. Other strategies for
operationalizing participation may also be crafted.160
1. Double-Duty Participation
One way to operationalize constituent input, even under
inauspicious conditions, is to collect participation through a mechanism
by which all parties are already incentivized to engage. In the case of
Baltimore’s water utility, the administrative due process and dispute
resolution procedures serve as this mechanism. Constituents opt in
because they stand to gain tangible benefits in the form of a resolution to
their concerns.161 Even constituents who distrust the agency are more
compelled, by the circumstances of their complaint, to engage in a dispute
resolution process than in unstructured input-gathering processes, like
townhalls, which may not offer a clear or tangible benefit.162
Dispute resolution procedures are not necessarily low-cost, but in
many cases they are demanded by due process and serve essential fairness
purposes, justifying their cost. CE Model dispute processes are thus
comparatively low-cost in that they serve “double-duty” in both resolving
159

See Lee, supra note 4, at 414–16.

160

Participation may be operationalized in many different ways. Local conditions are likely to be
crucial in determining which methods will be successful. Mechanisms like those presented here also
need not wholly replace more traditional forms of input-gathering, such as town halls and listening
sessions, which can be useful means of collecting input when appropriately funded and made easily
accessible to constituents.
161 BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17, 2-19 to -22 (2020).
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See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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individual disputes and in providing a mechanism by which to collect a
broad array of constituent input.163 For agencies already providing due
process hearings, incorporating a participatory input-gathering function
into these procedures will likely incur negligible additional costs for both
the agency and constituents.164
Another relatively low-cost method is to assess activities that
constituents and the utility are already engaged in, and to put data from
those activities to good use. For example, Baltimore’s Advocates must
collect data on the nature of complaints made by customers, whether and
how complaints are being resolved; how social services agencies are called
upon by low-income water customers; who is enrolled in discount plans
and who is not; and other matters.165 The collection and analysis of
already-existing constituent data adds another relatively low-cost form of
participation to be used to revise DPW’s policies.
The use of double-duty activities, like due process hearings and data
analysis, is designed to increase constituent participation by making it
relatively efficient and low-cost, and thus to reduce the likelihood that
insufficient participation can be cited to justify a cosmetic outcome.166
2. Participation Through A Proxy
Another way to operationalize constituent input is to use proxies.167
In a participatory undertaking of any substantial size, it is hard to imagine
that broad input could be feasible without the use of proxies. The proxy in
Baltimore, as an example, is the Advocate, which gathers, aggregates,
analyzes, filters, reports on, and applies a broad mass of constituent
163

See art. 24, §§ 2-17(b), 2-21.
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As noted, the model adopted by Baltimore City includes two new dispute resolution
processes: (1) the Advocate’s investigatory and problem-solving processes and (2) the traditional due
process hearings. See id. §§ 2-17(b)–(c), 2-21. For greater efficiency, these might conceivably be
combined into one process, but with careful attention to ensuring that the quality and nature of input
collected remains high. The Advocate’s process, for example, may be more likely to gather meaningful
input about the problems at hand and about their potential causes and solutions than would
traditional due process hearings.
165
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Id. § 2-17(c)–(d).

There can be disadvantages to low-cost forms of participation. The Baltimore methods of
participation do not, for example, foster the deep personal engagement, collective action, or
“inclusive, egalitarian culture and . . . sense of community or connection” that other, more robust
forms of democratic engagement do. Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative
Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (2006); see also Gius, supra note 43, at 58–59 (citing Steve Jenkins,
Organizing, Advocacy, & Member Power: A Critical Reflection, 6 WORKINGUSA 56, 71–72 (2002)).
The CE Model does, however, recognize the importance of those more robust forms of engagement
and is designed to work in tandem with them. See infra Section II.E.3.
167 Lee, supra note 4, at 429.
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input.168 In centralizing these functions, the proxy lightens the burden of
participation for each individual constituent and increases efficiency.
As discussed elsewhere in this Article, to be effective at meeting the
needs of those for whom they speak, proxies must be given affirmative
power, or else they (like their constituents) will be too easily disregarded.
This power must, however, be accompanied by appropriate safeguards.
Proxies must be employed with great caution,169 since a proxy who does
not properly represent constituent input destroys the integrity of the
participatory process, turning it into a cosmetic one. Whether
inadvertently or intentionally, a proxy can quite easily misrepresent or
misidentify constituent interests and needs.170 A proxy may have sincere
difficulty representing a diverse community that presents an array of
different voices and interests that may conflict with each other.171 A proxy
can also succumb to societal biases against marginalized people, including
preconceptions arising from existing power imbalances, and may be coopted or corrupted, such that it represents only a narrow range of
powerful constituent interests while purportedly speaking for others.172 In
any of these situations, the proxy’s representative power poses great
danger to the participatory process. Proxies thus must be constrained
from abusing their representative power. The more powerful a proxy is,
the more care must be taken to cabin its discretion and impose
accountability, so that the proxy hews closely to its mission of
representing marginalized constituents.173
The remaining two elements of the CE Model serve these functions,
among others. As discussed below, these elements cabin the proxy’s
discretion by mandating primacy for constituent voice and by instituting
multiple checks on the system through structural accountability,
including through opportunities for mass mobilization.
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See art. 24, §§ 2-17 to -23.
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See Lee, supra note 4, at 429 (“[P]roxies lack the direct experience that stakeholders themselves
offer and that the New Governance model so deeply values. Proxies may not adequately represent the
stakeholders’ interests, are susceptible to co-optation and acquiescence, and can be even ‘less inclusive
and less broadly accountable’ than the government.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Simon, supra note
36, at 177) (citing Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable
Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 657–58 (2011))); see also Lee, supra note 72, at 136–37, 137
n.228 (concerns about co-optation, acquiescence, or domination by proxies in participatory processes
in the public housing context); Christopher J. Tyson, From Ferguson to Flint: In Search of an
Antisubordination Principle for Local Government Law, 34 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 43–44
(2018).
170 See Tyson, supra note 169, at 43–44.
171

Id. at 44.

172

Lee, supra note 4, at 429; Tyson, supra note 169, at 44–45.

173

See Lee, supra note 4, at 429.
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D. Concept Two: Constituent Primacy
The essence of meaningful participation is that constituent voice
must not merely be collected, but that it must be responded to and
incorporated into policy reforms. As discussed, traditional participatory
governance relies on voluntary deliberation and consensus-building to
achieve this end but does not attempt to correct existing power
imbalances between the negotiating parties, which leads to cosmetic
outcomes. In contrast, the CE Model employs structural requirements to
affirmatively shift power to constituent voices. This is referred to as
Constituent Primacy.
Constituent Primacy is implemented through four different
strategies incorporated into the Baltimore system: (1) empowering the
constituent’s proxy to take meaningful action; (2) setting framework goals
and standards for assessment that prioritize and give specific weight to
constituent interests; (3) imposing transparency; and (4) protecting the
empowered proxy from institutional influence. These are not the only
ways to shift power to constituent voice,174 but illustrate how it might be
accomplished.
1. The Empowered Proxy
The Baltimore Advocate is a uniquely powerful proxy. It has the
power to investigate broadly, to determine the outcome of disputes, to
propose systemwide agency reforms, and to speak for and act on behalf of
constituents.175 It is thus imbued with investigatory and reporting powers
similar to those of an inspector general, with adjudicative powers similar
to those of due process hearing administrators, and with proposed
rulemaking powers similar to those of a regulatory agency.176 In all of these
ways, the constituent’s proxy is not merely given “a seat at the table,” but
sets the agenda for action. The strong empowerment of the constituent
proxy is a crucial protection against cosmetic outcomes.
As noted in the preceding Section, however, proxies also pose great
risks of abuse. Consequently, a proxy’s discretion must be narrowed so
that the proxy acts for the benefit of constituents and is restrained from
co-optation or corruption. With respect to the Baltimore Advocate, this
restraint is imposed through the multiple mechanisms discussed below.

174

Additional means of cabining a proxy’s discretion, for example, might include making the
proxy position an elected one or establishing multiple proxies.
175 BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17(b)–(c), 2-20(d) (2020).
176

Id. §§ 2-17 to -23.
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2. Framework Goals That Mandate Constituent Primacy
One mechanism for cabining the proxy’s discretion is the articulation
of “framework goals.”177 Framework goals set forth the overall purpose of
a participatory process and direct participants toward solving the
problems at hand.178 Framework goals are also accompanied by tentative
means of assessment, so that participants have clear guidance what they
are expected to achieve, along with a concrete gauge for measuring
success.179 Framework goals, combined with standards for assessing
progress toward those goals, are thus useful tools for cabining discretion.
Framework goals also can affirmatively shift power to constituent
voice and explicitly prioritize constituent needs. In Baltimore, for
example, the legislated mandate of the Advocate is to “promote fairness to
customers,”180 “serv[e] as a customer advocate,”181 “resolv[e] customer
concerns,”182 provide “problem-solving services,”183 and “create solutions
promoting customer fairness.”184 These goals are deliberately designed to
be open-ended and flexible,185 while also clearly directing the Advocate to
serve customer interests and develop long-term solutions. The Advocate
has power and discretion but must use both to serve the needs of
customers.
Another important restriction on the proxy’s discretion is that the
Advocate must give “great weight” to “data derived directly from customer
experiences . . . in designing reform proposals that promote customer
fairness.”186 This requirement elevates the importance of constituent
177

Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 79.

178

Id. For examples of strong use of framework goals, see Sturm, supra note 26, at 314 (signing a
contract stating framework goals); id. at 302–03, 305 (aligning framework goals with core institutional
vales and other benefits, such as avoiding lawsuits).
179 Sabel & Simon, supra note 18, at 79. Assessment measures can reduce the risk of abuse. See
Cameron Holley, Facilitating Monitoring, Subverting Self-Interest and Limiting Discretion: Learning From
“New” Forms of Accountability in Practice, 35 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 127, 206–07 (2010) (arguing that where
only general outcomes are specified, additional accountability mechanisms are required to thwart
abuse).
180

BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17(b)(1), 2-23(e)(3)(i)(B) (2020).

181

Id. § 2-17(c)(1).

182

Id. §§ 2-17(c)(3)(ii)(A), (C), 2-23(e)(3)(i)(B).

183

Id. § 2-20(a)(1).

184

Id. § 2-17(d)(3)(ii).

185

Care must be taken to craft framework goals that transfer power to constituents’ voices while
enabling constituents themselves to define the substantive content of those goals. See Ford, supra note
23, at 480 n.148; see also Bach, Governance, supra note 35, at 239 (“[T]he absence of substantive
participation by poor communities in goal-setting and program design fundamentally undermines
the experimentalist enterprise.”).
186 Art. 24, § 2-17(d)(4).
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input.187 The data must be gleaned from customers participating in dispute
resolution processes, as well as from others,188 and must address the nature
and frequency of concerns raised by customers,189 as well as “ideas solicited
from customers about potential causes of problems and potential
solutions that would promote customer fairness,”190 among other things.
This input must be used “to enable: (i) an understanding of the problems
experienced by customers and by [the water utility]; (ii) the design of
workable solutions; and (iii) the evaluation of whether reforms
implemented are successful,”191 including through the use of “metrics . . .
to measure the effectiveness” of reforms so that further improvements
may be proposed if needed.192 These provisions further shift power to
constituent voice by assigning it significant weight or credence, when
shaping both proposed reforms and the metrics for measuring whether
implemented reforms are in fact meeting customer needs.193 The
Advocate’s work is substantial and must be driven by constituent input,
thus affirmatively shifting power to constituent voice.
3. Transparency of Constituent Service
Constituent Primacy is further enforced through transparency. The
Advocate is charged with putting customer concerns at the forefront,194
but is held accountable for this task only if the public knows what the
Advocate is doing and whether it is, in fact, promoting their interests.
Accordingly, the Advocate must publicly testify both orally and in writing
twice a year before the Committee on Oversight and the public.195 It must
report on its work, the data it has collected, and how its reform proposals
promote customer fairness.196 The Advocate must also report on whether
its prior reforms are working and how that success is being measured. The
187

See Lee, supra note 4, at 431 (assigning a measure of weight to constituent input is a means of
achieving the baseline conditions).
188

See art. 24, § 2-17(d)(3)(vii).

189

Id. § 2-17(d)(3)(i).

190

Id. § 2-17(d)(3)(viii).

191

Id. § 2-17(d)(1)(i)–(iii). Since the proxy may be invested in declaring the success of the reforms
that it itself has designed, the use of data to measure whether reforms are effective is an important
additional check on proxy power.
192 Id. § 2-17(d)(4).
193 Lee, supra note 4, at 431. Assessment measures can also lower the risk of abuse. See Holley,
supra note 179, at 206–07 (arguing that where only general outcomes are specified, additional
accountability mechanisms are required to thwart abuse).
194 See art. 24, § 2-20.
195

Id. § 2-23(e)(3).

196

Id. § 2-17(d)(4).
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meetings must be open to the public, who must be allowed to testify.197
Transparency at each step should increase proxy accountability and thus
protect against a cosmetic process.198
4. Protecting the Proxy from Institutional Influence
To further maintain the proxy’s attention to its mission, the CE Model
requires that a proxy be shielded from undue influence exercised by other
participants. In the Baltimore case study, the co-opting or corrupting
influence is likely to emanate from the utility itself, which has long
resisted all efforts at reform and is likely to seek to dilute constituent
primacy. Accordingly, several countermeasures are in place.
Ideally, a proxy like the Advocate would serve as an independent
watchdog and be situated wholly outside of the formal boundaries of the
agency’s sphere of influence. The Advocate was therefore proposed to be
housed in a separate executive branch of government and to function fully
independent of the water utility itself.199 Options included situating the
Advocate under the auspices of an independent inspector general’s office,
for example, or of a legislative oversight committee.200 Formal structural
independence for the Advocate was fiercely resisted by the utility,
however, and failed as a legislative matter.201 Other efforts at creating a
firewall between DPW and the Advocate also failed, including efforts to
prevent hiring existing agency employees into Advocate positions and
attempts to create a fully transparent hiring process for the chief Advocate
role.202 The intensity of the utility’s opposition to the proxy’s independence
was perhaps not surprising. In cases like this, where the proxy’s goal is to
reform a highly recalcitrant actor, that actor’s most direct means of
resistance is to control and restrain the proxy.
While complete structural independence and transparent hiring was
not possible in the Baltimore case study, other meaningful protective
197

Id. § 2-23(e)(3)(ii).

198

See Bach, Governance, supra note 35, at 294–95; Patience A. Crowder, “Ain’t No Sunshine”:
Examining Informality and State Open Meetings Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment
Deal Making, 74 TENN. L. REV. 623, 656–58 (2007); see also Chester L. Mirsky & David Porter, Ambushing
the Public: The Socio-Political and Legal Consequences of SEQRA Decision-Making, 6 ALB. L. ENV’T
OUTLOOK J. 1, 27 (2002).
199 Balt., Md., Ordinance 20-336 (Jan. 27, 2020).
200

Id.

201

See id. (striking the proposed provision to BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 2-17(b)(3), stating
that the Advocate “shall operate independently and outside the control of the Department of Public
Works”).
202

See Balt., Md., Ordinance 20-468 (Dec. 7, 2020) (striking proposed amendment that would
prevent DPW employees from being hired into the Office of Customer Advocacy).
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mechanisms succeeded. These provisions are akin to those commonly
used to protect other types of executive branch officials, like inspectors
general and administrative law judges, who require freedom from
institutional interference to effectively perform their functions.203
Protections include legislatively mandated job qualifications for the chief
Advocate,204 protections against adverse employment actions against the
Advocate and against agency review or approval of the Advocate’s work, as
well as limits on communications between the Advocate and other agency
employees for the purposes of avoiding even the appearance of conflicts
of interest.205
Thus, while strong versions of proxy independence are most
desirable, it is possible that softer protections may still suffice,206 especially
when combined with other restrictions on the proxy’s discretion, as
discussed above, and when combined with structural accountability, as
discussed below.
E.

Concept Three: Structural Accountability

As described above, the CE Model incorporates numerous traditional
good-governance concepts, including transparency, framework goals and
standards, and protections against undue interference with reform efforts.
These serve to keep the proxy true to the needs of the constituents and to
thwart cooptation and corruption of the participatory process. Many of
these same mechanisms also serve a separate but equally crucial aim: to
pressure the agency to actually proceed with reform. But what happens if
the recalcitrant agency ultimately refuses to do so?
Procedural incentives are not necessarily sufficient to spur action and
create accountability, but must be accompanied by consequences for poor
behavior. Sabel and Simon discuss the need for “penalty defaults” that may
be triggered if a participatory process does not result in meaningful

203 Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency
Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1120, 1126 n.151, 1154 n.306 (2018) (explaining that inspector
generals and administrative law judges possess a great deal of decisional independence).
204 See BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 2-18(c) (2020).
205
206

See id. § 2-18(e).

Although the strongest protections against agency interference failed to pass into legislation
in Baltimore City, significant attention was drawn to the issue during the legislative process. This
attention heightened awareness of the danger of cosmeticism and the need to protect against it in
other ways. For instance, although a provision to forbid hiring existing agency employees failed to
become law, political pressure now exists to meet that expectation, even if it is not mandated. See
supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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change.207 A penalty default, in short, is something that is so undesirable
that the recalcitrant actor would prefer to make the changes sought rather
than suffer the effects of a penalty default. A classic example of a penalty
default is the threat of litigation, which can sometimes spark change by
even highly recalcitrant actors.208 Another example of a penalty default is
illustrated in the context of the judge that forces litigants into settlement
discussions. Litigants are incentivized to come to settlement because if
they do not, the judge will impose her own remedy on the parties, which
is less likely to be closely tailored to the parties’ interests than a settlement
that the parties agree to on their own.209 Especially in the case of a
recalcitrant actor, some combination of strong penalty defaults must be
imposed for the participatory process to result in affirmative change.
While penalty defaults may be fashioned in various ways,210 those
implemented in Baltimore are discussed below.
1. Penalty Default: Legislated Reform
Two penalty defaults were designed to strongly encourage the
Baltimore water utility to adopt the reforms proposed by the Advocate.
One penalty default is that, should DPW refuse to voluntarily adopt the
Advocate’s reforms, the City Council may use its legislative powers to turn
those proposals into law.211 The threat of policy and procedural reform
being imposed through hard law, without the utility’s assent or input, is
intended to spur the utility to seriously consider the Advocate’s reform
207 Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1067; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 428, 439; Sabel & Simon,
supra note 18, at 81.
208 For the importance of instituting “hard rights” to enforce participatory structures, see Lee,
supra note 4, at 427 (“Many New Governance case studies involve participatory processes that
occurred in the shadow of litigation, where lawsuits had already been filed [but the participants were
officially out of the court’s supervision,] or where lawsuits had not yet been filed but conceivably
might have been. Setting framework goals backed up by hard rights can . . . motivate participants to
work toward that goal.”); Arnold S. Rosenberg, Motivational Law, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 111, 114 (2008)
(discussing that “motivational law” can increase compliance with “regulatory” or hard law); David M.
Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and
Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 541 (2006) (discussing “hybrid system[s] in which innovation,
negotiation and self-monitoring are fore-grounded, while regulatory enforcement remains in the
background as a default option”).
209
210

See Sabel & Simon, supra note 36, at 1099–100.

A common penalty default is the threat of litigation. The Baltimore law employs this tool in
providing customers with a new right to appeal unsatisfactory utility decisions to the courts. See BALT.,
MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 2-21 (2020). This penalty default, while perhaps useful for those challenging
individual dispute outcomes, is much more difficult to deploy when enforcing the participatory
process.
211 See BALT., MD., CITY CHARTER art. III, § 11 (2020).
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proposals and to voluntarily adopt and implement them. The notion is
that the agency will prefer the plasticity of internally controlled
regulations over the inflexibility of legislative mandates that will
permanently bind the agency’s discretion.
City Council action is thus a threatened penalty default that might
spur the recalcitrant water utility into action. While meaningful agency
action in response to threatened penalty defaults is by no means assured,
real world experience in Baltimore has shown that the mere threat of
legislative action can indeed encourage some change.212
2. Penalty Default: Public Hearings and the Potential for
Mobilization
The second type of penalty default imposed in Baltimore is one of the
most traditional and direct forms of public participation: public
hearings.213 The Baltimore legislation mandates semi-annual hearings at
which the Advocate and the utility must testify about the status of
customer satisfaction and the reforms being proposed or being
implemented.214 These hearings gather further constituent input; provide
transparency and accountability; keep water customers’ concerns
prominently showcased on the public agenda; allow for progress to be
measured and for reform proposals to be vetted; and set the stage for
legislative action as a penalty default if the utility does not voluntarily
reform itself.215 Each of these functions help to provide a public stage for
notice-and-comment-like procedures, making the hearings important
tools against cosmeticism.
In addition, these public hearings also serve another crucial function:
to provide regular occasions for unfiltered feedback from any and all
constituents, which in turn provides a platform for collective community
protest and potentially for mass mobilization. Hearings draw constituents
together and enable them to both individually express opinions and to
collectively identify common grievances. Hearings often draw media
attention, which in turn can further amplify constituent voice, generate
additional activism and coalition-building, heighten scrutiny of the issues,

212

For example, after the water affordability program was introduced as sponsored legislation,
the water utility became motived to design its own alternative affordability program. See Brittany
Brown, Baltimore Activists Urge City Council To Pass Water Affordability Legislation, BALT. SUN (July 1,
2019), https://perma.cc/2ZPF-K9RB.
213

See BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, §§ 2-17, 2-21 to -23 (2020); see also Jacobson, supra note 59,

at 23.
214

See §§ 2-17(3), 2-23(e)(3).

215

See id. §§ 2-17(d), 2-21 to -23.
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and increase pressure for meaningful reform.216 Hearings can thus serve to
generate additional forms of public power and inventive for change.
In this way, hearings play a crucial role as penalty defaults. Rising
constituent voice, increased media attention, and heightened legislative
scrutiny, alone or in combination, can penalize a recalcitrant actor for
continued inaction. Thus, public hearings not only provide a platform for
substantive input, but they also serve as a penalty default that can
incentivize reform in and of themselves.
Importantly, hearings may serve not only to hold the utility to
account, but to hold to account the participatory process itself. That is, if
the process itself is cosmetic or corrupt, constituents can voice
dissatisfaction and expose how the Advocate is straying from its
mission.217 Public hearings can therefore be an effective way to uncover
corrupt or co-opted proxies218 and to provide a check on the participatory
process itself.219 It seems fitting that the ultimate check on the integrity of
participatory process as a whole is, in itself, a participatory mechanism.
3. The Relationship of the CE Model to Other Conceptions of
Constituent Power
With the components of the CE Model having been explored in detail,
it is now appropriate to consider the larger picture and discuss how the
CE Model differs from, but works in tandem with, other scholarly
conceptions about the development and use of constituent power. In sum,
the CE Model incorporates greater safeguards against cosmeticism than
traditional systems do, but still has some vulnerabilities. The model
addresses these by making space for the exercise of a different form of
216

For a discussion on the power of public hearings, see Melish, supra note 4, at 78–80, 84, 97,
which examines the ability of public hearings to unify stakeholders, increase public engagement, and
foster public participation in legislative reform for issues concerning poverty and welfare reform.
217 See art. 24, § 2-23 (discussing review processes for actions taken by the Office of Customer
Advocacy).
218 The power of the public hearing in Baltimore is such that even if constituents are distrustful
and disdainful of the participatory process, they are still likely to engage in public hearings. Public
hearings are a familiar format to Baltimoreans, access to the microphone is not limited, and recently,
testimony from constituents outraged about water issues has lasted up to three hours. City Council
Hearing; March 25, 2021, YOUTUBE (Mar. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/D62J-MQPL. The ability to speak
directly to elected officials in a public forum is a form of power that city residents will continue to
exercise.
219

Enabling direct and unfiltered constituent input is one way to check that proxies are
providing fair representation. See Lee, supra note 4, at 429 (“Given these limitations, reliance on the
use of proxies . . . must be carefully considered. . . . As a check on proxy representation, . . . systems
might also build in periodic consultation with the stakeholders directly, or solicit impact statements
by stakeholders who object to the proxies’ representation.” (footnote omitted)).
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constituent power, specifically, power developed by constituents
themselves in ways that are wholly outside of and independent of the
participatory system. This means that constituents need not choose
between one form of power or another, but rather can employ multiple
forms of power in their effort to move a recalcitrant agency toward
reform.
Like traditional participatory approaches, the CE Model creates a
formal procedural framework through which decisionmakers can hear the
perspective of constituents. In traditional models, however, the
decisionmakers retain discretion as to whether to incorporate or disregard
that input. Traditional models thus merely offer the opportunity for
voluntary power-sharing. In contrast, the CE Model mandates powersharing by intentionally shifting certain powers to a proxy, who must use
that power to promote constituents’ interests. The CE Model does not
merely invite participation, but instead demands responsiveness; it is not
purely procedural, but instead strongly promotes substantive change. In
sum, while the CE model and traditional systems both rely on a similar
procedural framework, the CE Model provides a significantly stronger
form of constituent empowerment.220
Despite this, the CE Model remains vulnerable, as even strong
versions may fail. For example, despite the use of low-cost participatory
mechanisms, Baltimoreans might still be unable or unwilling to engage
due to a lack of time, resources, or trust, resulting in insufficient input.
Despite the safeguards put in place to protect the Advocate’s
independence and integrity, the utility still might divert the Advocate
from its customer-service mission, such as by abusing its hiring and firing
authority or through other forms of pressure. The utility might also simply
refuse to adopt the Advocate’s reforms and the City Council might in turn
refuse to legislate them, thus making the penalty defaults ineffective. In
other words, despite careful planning and design, key components of the
CE Model still may fail, which in turn would cause a failure of the system
as a whole.
In light of these vulnerabilities, an ultimate means of accountability
is needed. Traditional participatory systems often lack this, but in
Baltimore, ultimate accountability is made possible through the
mandatory public hearings. As discussed above, the hearings provide
regular opportunities for community mobilization and other forms of
collective, constituent-led contestation221 of both the substance discussed
and of the participatory process itself. Contestation can be an effective a

220

See Rahman & Simonson, supra note 22, at 683–85, 727 (providing multiple factors by which
to assess the level of influence wielded by members of the public).
221 See Lee, supra note 4, at 429–31.
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form of power, especially when expressed collectively, as discussed in a
rich body of legal scholarship.222 Importantly, this kind of constituent
power is not dependent on power being shared through a formal
participatory structure; rather, such power is generated in ways that are
independent from, and outside of, any participatory structure. The CE
Model is not centered around this kind of independent power generation
or power claiming. It recognizes, however, its importance to creating
change and accordingly provides regular opportunities for its realization.
Importantly, the same individuals who engage in the CE Model are
fully able to also engage in contestatory, adversarial relationships with
those in power. This is an important change from traditional participatory
systems, where participants face pressure to avoid adversarial approaches
because the goal is a collaborative and consensus-seeking process, and
because their access to that process—and thus their potential for
influence—can be revoked at any time.223 Thus, constituents frequently
feel that in order to engage effectively in a participatory process, they must
surrender their ability to wield contestatory power. The CE Model avoids
this need to choose these two forms of power and enables constituents to
fully engage in both a formal participatory structure as well as in other,
more independent, and more adversarial exercises of power. These
multiple powers might be deployed simultaneously, or with greater
emphasis on one or the other at different times, or iteratively, depending
on the circumstances at hand.
In short, the CE Model is designed to work in tandem with and as a
complement to other power-building techniques, not as an alternative to
them. This is an important distinction because multiple forms of power
can likely be used in combination, to great effect, throughout the long,
slow process of reforming a recalcitrant institution. It may well be that
contestatory power and participatory power are both necessary to achieve
change.
222

The relevant body of literature spans many decades and cannot properly be summarized in a
brief footnote. For just a few examples of articles reflecting recent thinking and/or discussions of the
long history of this literature, see, for example, Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and
a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1988); Scott L. Cummings,
The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 1554 (2017); Michael Haber,
CED After #OWS: From Community Economic Development to Anti-Authoritarian Community CounterInstitutions, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 295 (2016); and Simonson, supra note 37.
223 See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development in the
Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 302, 303 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A.
Scheingold eds., 2006) (arguing that collaborative negotiation models may lead to quiescence);
Freeman, supra note 41, at 84–85 (“[P]roviding access to groups who define themselves in terms of
their outsider status might undermine their role as critics of the system. Some organizations will view
the participation and responsibility that collaboration portends as ultimately disempowering.”); see
also Gius, supra note 43.
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Conclusion
In closing, it is worth briefly considering how the CE Model might be
adapted to other contexts. Scholars have cited public infrastructure
management as a matter that could benefit from more constituent
input.224 So too might other types of public services institutions, such as
school systems, police departments, social services agencies, transit
departments, and public health departments. A mayor or legislature might
map the basic structure of the Baltimore example onto other kinds of
executive branch agencies with relative ease, requiring them to put due
process hearings to “double duty” use, as in Baltimore,225 and establishing
a constituent proxy who is empowered yet also constrained by
transparency requirements, an oversight body, and public hearings—all of
which are generally familiar in the context of executive branch agencies.
Whether the CE Model should be pursued in any given context, of
course, is a different question than whether it practically could be. Some
threshold inquiries may be helpful in exploring the appropriateness of a
CE model for other contexts. The CE Model might be valuable, for
example, where progress is anticipated to be incremental and difficult,
such as where long-term systemic change or shifts in institutional culture
will require sustained engagement and long-term monitoring. The CE
Model also may be useful where an institution cannot or will not
relinquish control over key resources. For example, specialized technical
knowledge is needed to administer water infrastructure,226 and since it is
a public good, the local constitution or political environment may not
permit delegation of its control to non-government actors.227 In such
cases, a moderate power-sharing arrangement like that of the CE Model
may be appropriate.228
Thinking about applying the CE Model to private institutions raises a
host of additional questions. One must consider not only whether the CE
Model is appropriate for the nature of the problem at hand, but also
whether a private institution has infrastructural elements that could help
224 See K. Sabeel Rahman, Constructing Citizenship: Exclusion and Inclusion Through the
Governance of Basic Necessities, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2447, 2447–48 (2018).
225 See BALT., MD., CITY CODE art. 24, § 2-17 (2020).
226

See generally JOSEPH KANE & ADIE TOMER, RENEWING THE WATER WORKFORCE: IMPROVING
WATER INFRASTRUCTURE AND CREATING A PIPELINE TO OPPORTUNITY (2018), https://perma.cc/RBD4VNLJ.
227 See, e.g., Shelley Welton, Decarbonization in Democracy, 67 UCLA L. REV. 56, 102 (2020)
(“Requiring utilities to report on citizen energy preferences would enhance broad-based citizen input
without devolving power or control.”).
228

Attempts to transfer power over police policy to members of the public, for example, have
met with resistance. See Simonson, supra note 37.
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to implement the system. For instance, private institutions with a highly
centralized command-and-control structure may very well have a strong
potential “executor,”229 making the CE Model relatively easy to implement.
On the other hand, private institutions may be less likely to have due
process systems or other forms of constituent engagement already in
place, or to have a preexisting ethos of transparency and oversight. Private
institutions thus may need to be more creative in finding ways to
operationalize participation or create structural accountability.
These are only a few of the many issues to consider when
contemplating the broader applicability of the CE Model to other
contexts. Naturally, any such adaptation would require careful
consideration and extensive tailoring to each unique context. It is hoped
that this Article may provide a starting point for contemplating such
possibilities.

229

See Lee, supra note 4, at 423.

